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Iwakuni (I)

In the General Emergency Operations Plan, a number of the bases scheduled to deliver nuclear weapons in the event of general war were in Japan. But U.S. plans for using these bases collided with a central Japanese policy, which renounced and forbade the development, possession, or *introduction* of nuclear weapons in Japan. A legacy of Hiroshima was what U.S. planners called Japan's nuclear "allergy." A major provision of Japan's security arrangements with the U.S. was the explicit agreement in writing that no nuclear weapons would be stationed in Japan. Any abrogation of this agreement could easily have cost us our major Asian ally and our most strategically important bases in the East.¹

In practice the U.S. acted as if there were one exception to this agreement. It was, I was told, known to some high officials in Japan, but it was never acknowledged publicly by either side. American warships that came into Japanese ports for R-and-R ("rest and recreation" visits, which were very important to maintaining Navy morale in the Pacific, and thus reenlistment), or for other reasons, virtually all had nuclear weapons aboard. This didn't apply only to the carriers, which were loaded with nuclear bombs for their planes. As Admiral Eugene LaRocque later testified, nearly every Navy ship that

¹ [see ref, Matthew Jones, After Hiroshima]

could carry a nuclear weapon of some kind did so, down to destroyers that had nuclear torpedoes and antisubmarine weapons. None of them ever offloaded these weapons before they came into a Japanese harbor, or anywhere else.

The Department of Defense had a policy that we would not acknowledge the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on any particular warship anywhere in the world. A major purpose of that policy was to avoid having either to lie explicitly or to admit having nuclear weapons aboard these ships in Japanese ports when the political opposition in Japan or antinuclear activists raised the question, which they did regularly. When Japanese officials were asked this question, they said (falsely) they were confident there were no nuclear weapons present on these ships, since they had not been notified otherwise by the U.S.

The U.S. could justify its failure to notify the Japanese otherwise on the grounds, first, that Japanese officials didn't want to be told officially, so they could continue to give this answer without demonstrably lying. And if the truth ever came out, the U.S. could say that its understanding of the agreement didn't require it to notify the Japanese of the presence of weapons that were not "stationed" in Japan but were merely in transit, on temporary visits.

Still, the fact that these weapons would be present in Japanese ports for days to weeks at a time on a given ship, and that at any given time there was usually one or more such ships somewhere at anchor in Japanese harbors, meant that Japanese coastal cities surely constituted high-priority targets in Soviet nuclear war planning, just as if they had had nuclear weapons permanently stationed there. And since these weapons were on ships, the chance of a collision or an accident detonating the high explosives on one of these weapons

or otherwise releasing radioactive materials in the vicinity of a Japanese city was not zero, and it was higher than it would have been if the weapons had been stored ashore.

That possibility also applied to the nuclear reactors on nuclear-powered ships and submarines. Eventually, the DOD hoped to be able to bring Polaris submarines into Japanese waters, with their additional risk of an accident involving a nuclear-tipped missile, as in the case of the bombs on carriers or other ship-based weapons. A high-explosive detonation could conceivably lead to a partial or full nuclear explosion, but even without that unlikely result, the dispersion of radioactive material in a populated area would be a spectacularly bad way of announcing to the Japanese public the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in their waters.ⁱ But the risk, compared to the convenience of using Japanese ports, seemed small enough to be worth taking.

However, I was always told, we didn't violate the agreement to the extent of actually basing weapons ashore in any of our U.S. Air Force bases in Japan. Planes on these bases were assigned a very sizeable number of nuclear targets in the Vladivostok area and China in general war, but their weapons would have to come at that time from Okinawa or Guam. There were KC-97 tankers on alert in Okinawa loaded with nuclear weapons for these Japanese bases. The operation involving them was codenamed High Gear. If there was an order to execute war plans or a launch on warning, these planes would take off for Japan.

In principle, we were to get the approval of the Japanese government before any weapons could be landed in Japan or launched from Japanese bases. But the alert plans called for the transport planes, once launched from Okinawa on warning, to land on bases in Japan and deliver their weapons whether or not permission had yet been granted from the Japanese. There was no provision for them to return to their bases on Okinawa with bombs

aboard if the warning turned out to be a false alarm, as in the case of the fighter-bombers on alert in Okinawa, or if the Japanese failed to grant permission during the several-hour flight to Japan.

Unlike the fighter-bombers, there was no arrangement for these transports to “launch on positive control” in the event of ambiguous warning. While the bombers were to fly to a rendezvous area to circle around waiting for an execute order, (hopefully) returning to base if they didn’t get one, the High Gear transports launched at the same time would go on to land at U.S. bases in Japan whether or not an execute order followed. So a false warning, as well as a true one, could have resulted in U.S. nuclear bombs landing in Japan, violating the treaty. That was a possibility explicitly allowed in our planning, kept secret from the Japanese. If that had become known to the Japanese public, the effect might have been almost as bad as if they had become aware that the plan had been carried out. But it seemed unlikely that the Japanese would learn of this planning. The risk was regarded as acceptable. And if a false alarm did occur, the planes would be landing at U.S. bases, so the Japanese were unlikely to become aware of a temporary violation.

The very complexity of these plans was a tribute to the fact that the treaty provision was taken with considerable seriousness. Everyone understood that a known violation of that provision was likely to lead to an abrogation of the security treaty, and probably to the fall of any pro-U.S. government in Japan, and its replacement with a government that might entirely change its relationship with the U.S. and China. Almost certainly it would lead to the loss of U.S. bases both in Japan and in Okinawa.

That was why there was apparently no pressure from the Air Force to accept the risks of discovery by the Japanese in order to have weapons stored on the bases with their

planes at all times, in secret violation of the treaty. SAC already had nuclear forces stationed in Okinawa and Korea, so having marginally more forces in Japan didn't justify taking diplomatic risks of losing Japan as an ally and as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier," as Britain was called in World War II.

However, in early 1960 I was told in great secrecy by a nuclear control officer in the Pacific that one small Marine air base at Iwakuni in Japan had a secret arrangement whereby the handful of planes on it with general war missions would get their nuclear weapons very quickly in the event of a general war alert. In contrast to all the other planes on Japanese bases, the Marines at Iwakuni would have nuclear weapons within minutes instead of hours. Because of the special relation of the Marines to the Navy, there was an LST (Landing Ship, Tank) anchored just offshore Iwakuni with nuclear weapons aboard, loaded onto amphibious tractors, just for the small group of planes on this base.

This LST, the U.S.S. *San Joaquin County*, had a cover mission as an electronics repair ship. It was permanently stationed not just in the three-mile limit of Japanese territorial waters, but anchored a couple of hundred yards from the beach, in the tidal waters. By any standards it was stationed within the territory of Japan. And so were its nuclear weapons.

In any kind of nuclear emergency, the *San Joaquin County* would operate as it was designed to do in an amphibious landing. It would haul anchor and come straight ashore. The front of the ship would open up like a clamshell and amphibious tractors loaded with nuclear weapons would come down a ramp into the water or directly onto the beach, then head on land straight to the airstrip where the weapons would be loaded onto the Marine planes.

Thus this handful of planes would have nuclear weapons some six to ten hours in advance of the other hundreds of Air Force planes on bases in Japan. If they made use of this and launched on their missions immediately, they would be among the very first planes in the world, along with planes on Korea, to release bombs on Communist targets. Since they were so few and their targets so peripheral, the main effect of this would be to alert Communist forces worldwide of the onset of general war, if they had not launched first. But presumably in most cases the Marine planes would be held back to be launched with other forces, so that the effect of their having weapons sooner would be imperceptible.

However, the effect of the Japanese discovering the permanent presence of these weapons would be very perceptible indeed. It might well blow the U.S. out of Japan. If the Japanese government should become aware of the situation, and more particularly if the political opposition became aware of it, the U.S. was likely to lose all its bases in Japan. There could be even be a total rupture of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Japan. Japan might possibly shift toward the Chinese.

So it was regarded as a super-secret from the Japanese and was relatively little-known even among U.S. Air Force and Navy planners. Yet the arrangement was apparently fairly well known at the base itself, and the LST was said rehearse occasionally landing the tractors and bombs. What was known to the pilots, the tractor crews and the crew of the LST at the base was potentially knowable to some fraction of their Japanese girlfriends in the region. In fact, the planners to whom I spoke about this, at Seventh Fleet, in Japan and back in Hawaii, tended to assume that Communist spies must already know of the situation and were waiting for the time and the right way to

reveal it to biggest effect.

RAND studies of possibilities of sabotage suggested to me what that way could be. It would be no trick for Communist frogmen, Japanese or others, to swim out to that ship and plant limpet mines on the side of it. An explosion on what purported to be an electronics repair ship would at the least raise public questions about its nature and official investigation which could quickly reveal its cargo of nuclear weapons. If the saboteurs were lucky and used a big enough mine, they might even detonate the high explosive on one or more of the nuclear weapons aboard, scattering radioactive material in the Iwakuni region (which happened to be not far from Hiroshima), or even conceivably cause a partial nuclear explosion. In fact, to think big, the mine itself could be nuclear. There would be no way of telling, in any of these cases, that the explosion had been caused by outsiders as opposed to an accidental explosion of American weapons stationed aboard the ship. The actual cause of the explosion that destroyed the battleship *Maine* in Havana harbor, propelling the U.S. into war over a hundred years ago, remains uncertain to this day.

The stationing of these weapons in Japanese tidal waters, to no tangible benefit whatever, was one of the most irresponsible actions it was possible to imagine. That's how it seemed to all the nuclear planners who were in on the secret. But they didn't know what to do about it, since they presumed it had been accepted by CINCPAC, a Navy admiral. Did any civilian authorities, or military commands higher than CINCPAC, know about it? These officers didn't know, and they could try to find out or alert higher levels bypassing intermediate levels of command and CINCPAC only at great risk to their own careers.

That may be why one officer told me about it in the first place, and why others told me their concern about it. As a RAND consultant, someone not permanently wired into their chain of command, I could alert higher levels or other agencies without paying the same price they would have had to. But they could justify telling me because of the general instructions they had received that they could tell me anything, for purposes of our research.ⁱⁱ

I wasn't sure what to do with the information either, since I didn't then have contacts in the Office of Secretary of Defense, the State Department or the White House. I told high officials at RAND about it, and they in turn, I was told, passed it on to a general in Air Force plans. Richard Goldstein, a RAND vice president, brought the word back to me that Air Force officers agreed that this was an extremely serious situation but it wasn't easy for them to do anything about it because it was a Navy matter. For many years there had a working alliance between the Navy and the Air Force to emphasize the importance to the U.S. of nuclear weapons, which worked to the budgetary disadvantage of the Army. It would be a delicate matter, threatening this alliance, for the Air Force to raise questions about where and how the Navy was storing its nuclear weapons. It wasn't prudent for the Air Force to make waves for the Navy, so to speak.

In 1960, I didn't know what I could do about this problem, or the command and control problems I had been discovering, including delegation, or the nature of the war plans. Just who would make the decision to go nuclear war? What I was learning indicated that that might have depended on weather and its effects on communications from Oahu or Washington. And if it were made, on the basis of prior authorization, in Hawaii or Westpac rather than Washington, that in turn would have determined the

content of the decision, almost surely in favor of nuclear war against China.

The question was whether the president had ever meant to put that decision, for part of any given day, in the hands of the commander of the Seventh Fleet, and whether he should do that. If not, I was coming to think, he had better make that very explicit and clear to all concerned and check that the guidance had gotten through. And he should even consider withdrawing the precedent he had set by giving such authority to Admiral Kivette's superior, Admiral Felt.

These were matters that needed to be raised in Washington, though how, to whom and through what channels were delicate questions. It wouldn't serve anything if the main reaction to my reporting and recommendations should be consternation that I knew and was conveying this sensitive information, and an effort to track down and punish the people who had told me. Since I was working for CINCPAC precisely on command and control of nuclear operations, the officers who had told me could argue that they felt I had a "need to know," but it was harder for me to make that case for telling someone outside the Pacific Command unless they were above CINCPAC in the chain of command. Who in Washington had the authority to investigate and perhaps change this situation?

Obviously, the President, but at this point I wasn't working for anyone in the White House on these matters, nor was anyone at RAND. It was hard to contemplate getting to the President or any staff person close to him without revealing what it was that needed urgent attention. Yet to reveal it to anyone who didn't know it already (that is, to almost anyone) was to open myself to subsequent charges of extreme indiscretion, a major breach of security. That could quickly knock me, and RAND as well, out of the chance of remedying this situation or any other.ⁱⁱⁱ

I had to proceed carefully.

i. In December 1965 a plane with a nuclear weapon aboard slipped off the deck of the USS *Ticonderoga* and fell into a deep sea trench, from which the weapon was never recovered. The accident was kept secret until 1981, and at that time it was described as occurring 500 miles from Japan. What was still not disclosed was that though it had been that distance from the mainland, it was only 80 miles from Okinawa. Why a plane loaded with a nuclear weapon was being launched from the *Ticonderoga* in December, 1965 (during a highly-publicized, month-long “negotiating pause” in the Rolling Thunder bombing of North Vietnam) has never become clear.

ii. [This point applies in particular to my being shown the JSCP and educated in detail on bureaucratic rivalries by officers in the Air Staff, who felt the plans needed changing. I may introduce this point in connection with that.]

This ability to short-circuit bureaucratic channels of communication, to bypass intermediate levels or interagency walls that might have bottled up embarrassing but crucial information, was a little-recognized potential of a consulting organization like RAND, which could have been seen as one of its most valuable functions. It came to be a specialty of mine.

I conceived of my act of copying and giving the Pentagon Papers to a Senate Committee in 1969 and then to the public through the press in 1971—having come to see these, on the basis of the Constitution, as having higher authority than the Executive in matters of war and peace—as extending and repeating what I had been doing professionally for more than a decade: moving from lower to higher levels of authority information and warnings that had been wrongfully blocked, withheld or distorted at intermediate levels.

iii. Considerations like these have no doubt been involved in the extreme reluctance of people in Congress and news media to whom I have revealed this situation over the past twenty-five years to act on the information, by holding hearings or publishing the information. See my account below of dealings with Senator Symington, Representative Zablocki, Seymour Hersh, Walter Cronkhite, Robert Woodward, Carl Bernstein, Robert Shachne of CBS, and others.

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8:40 AM
Iwakuni II edit.doc

Iwakuni (II)

Paul Nitze, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, was in charge of both policy planning in the Pentagon and military liaison with foreign countries, including base rights. In April 1961, after I completed the BNSP, I told his deputy, my friend Harry Rowen about the situation in Iwakuni. He asked me to describe the situation in writing for Nitze, and to do the typing myself for special security. I typed out a memo and stamped it "Top Secret—Eyes Only for Paul Nitze."

("Eyes Only" was not a classification but a handling designation indicating that this was not for routine distribution within an agency or office and was not to be copied or shown to anyone other than the specific addressees listed in the heading; it was "for their eyes only.")

I wrote in detail all that I knew about the role of the San Joaquin County and how I had come to know it. I also provided an exhaustive analysis of the pros and cons, since anyone first hearing of such an anomaly would tend to assume there must be some highly technical reason justifying it. I reported that, to the officers aware of it in the theater, it was evident that there was no strategic or technical rationale at all for the arrangement, no tangible military advantage counterbalancing the obvious diplomatic risks.

The reason the Marine planes on Iwakuni were provided such ready access to nuclear weapons was simply that their landing strip was near the beach, the Marines were part of the Navy and practiced in amphibious operations, and the Navy was able and

willing to provide them secretly an LST close by. Presumably the Air Force wasn't tempted to do something similar for its own planes, because it wasn't practical to keep, say, a KC-97 tanker loaded with nuclear weapons flying continuously above an Air Force base in Japan.

It wasn't even as though a large number of Navy bases were benefited by this, so that it would affect a sizeable part of the forces in Japan or the theater. This violation of the treaty affected only a handful of weapons at one base. Yet the political risk was virtually the same as if it had been a lot of bases.

Nitze had my memo "staffed out." He assigned his assistant Timothy Stanley to investigate the problem. Stanley had me rewrite my report for other staffers. Eventually I was shown various reports that came out of this.¹ All the facts that I had presented were confirmed. The foreign affairs specialists within ISA also corroborated that the situation was a clear-cut violation of both letter and spirit of our security treaty with Japan.

In these responses, Iwakuni was contrasted with marginal cases like the carrier visits and even the possibility of our emergency alert plans being executed. The San Joaquin County was a permanent arrangement. It couldn't even be said to be "in the waters, not on the territory," since the ship was so close that it would be regarded by every legal test as being on the territory of Japan. The answers also corroborated the extreme diplomatic risks this situation involved, and concluded that it was highly urgent to correct this situation immediately.

But a new piece of information came in as well. One of the staffers—I believe, Larry McQuade,--reported that, on first investigating the situation, he went to the special assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Weapons and Atomic Energy Gerald W.

Johnson, who was responsible for knowing the whereabouts of every individual nuclear weapon in the world, including test devices and weapons under production. The Special Assistant possessed an enormous looseleaf notebook that contained the reported location of every operational weapon in the world. No weapons were listed in Japan. No ship carrying weapons was listed as stationed there. In fact, the book contained no indication that a situation such as I described existed.

When Nitze's investigator pressed the point, Johnson, whose job as a direct representative of the Secretary of Defense afforded him very high status, picked up the phone and called his counterpart in the Navy to check on it. He was told that there was no such situation, that my story had no basis.

However, in pursuing the name I had supplied for the LST, Nitze's man soon discovered that the San Joaquin County was listed in Navy records as home-ported in Okinawa. By further interviews, he discovered that it was being carried that way in Navy reporting precisely as a cover to deceive the Special Assistant and his boss about the fact that it was permanently based in Iwakuni, except for a few months every three years when it was in Okinawa for repairs and overhaul. By coincidence, at the very time of this investigation it was back in Okinawa undergoing its triennial refitting, which would take another month or so.

Deceiving the Secretary of Defense on the whereabouts of a nuclear weapon was the highest imaginable offense within the bureaucracy. No one could miss that, reading this report. It was not within the rules of the bureaucratic game, in the remotest sense. But there was an obvious bureaucratic solution. All that had to be done was to keep the LST in Okinawa, where it was officially home-ported and where it happened to be at the moment.

Nitze's staff recommended that he take this up immediately with McNamara. A directive was drafted for him to give to McNamara to send to the Chief of Naval Operations, ordering the ship not to return to Japan. McNamara signed and sent it to the CNO.

Harry Rowen told me what happened. Soon after the directive went out from McNamara, Nitze happened to be at a meeting in McNamara's office on another matter, along with Admiral Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations. At the end of the meeting, Burke asked Nitze to return with him to Burke's office, in a different part of the Pentagon. When they arrived at the office, Burke sat down at his desk. Nitze saw immediately that he had in front of him a "burn copy" (the predecessor to the Xerox process, a somewhat fuzzy copy on tan, flimsy paper) of my "Top Secret—Eyes Only" memo, which was intended for Nitze alone and wasn't supposed to be copied.

Nitze's subordinates in ISA were mostly military officers, and it was obvious that some commander or captain or rear admiral working for him had seen my memo, copied it and delivered it to Admiral Burke. He also had on the desk a copy of the ISA investigative report, along with McNamara's directive to him.

Burke started discussing my memo and the report, neither of which were supposed to have been sent out of ISA. He made no explanation about what he was doing with them, which surprised Nitze more than it might have later, after he'd had more experience inside the Pentagon. (International Security Affairs was staffed largely with active military officers on loan from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. The same was true for the other agencies under Assistant Secretaries, like Systems Analysis or Manpower. In theory these officers were not representing their services but, for the length of this duty, had only one boss, the Assistant Secretary. But ultimately, their promotions, their next duty assignment, and their careers depended on their home service. Probably every piece of

paper that crossed the desk of one of these officers that looked of possible relevance to his own service was copied or paraphrased for the information of that service. It could take a long time for a civilian employee or the Assistant Secretary to grasp this, if he ever did.)

“Burke was furious,” Nitze had told Rowen. Burke was famously given to rages, but this one, in front of an Assistant Secretary of Defense, was another surprise to Nitze. Burke made no attempt to deny the facts of the reports or to justify anything. The only thing he had to say, in a fury, was “What did you think you were doing, as a civilian, interfering with the operations of ships of the U.S. Navy?”

The fact that this ship was in violation of one of our most important security treaties and was posing enormous diplomatic risks, that it was carrying nuclear weapons in violation of regulations on their whereabouts and in deliberate deception of the Secretary of Defense, that the Special Assistant to the Secretary had been lied to by the Navy—none of these was brought up by Burke nor was he willing to hear about them. He maintained that it was absolutely unacceptable that the Secretary of Defense should presume to tell the Navy where to put its ships.

Rowen got the impression that Nitze left the office shaken by Burke’s willingness to confront him in this way, but determined to have the Navy brought into line. He himself was not in a clear-cut command position with respect to Burke, except as he was accepted as a direct representative of the Secretary. So everything depended on McNamara’s standing by his directive and backing Nitze on this issue. Rowen told me that Nitze went to McNamara and told him this was of the highest urgency and that he should order Burke to comply with his directive and with the treaty.

I asked Rowen, “So what’s happened?”

“McNamara decided to withdraw the directive. He backed off. With all the fights he’s having with the Services he didn’t want to add this one.”

I asked, “Does McNamara know he was lied to by the Navy?”

Harry said, "Yes, that's what made him furious in the first place. It's what got him to send the directive." But faced with Nitze's account of Burke's own fury, McNamara had to pick his fights, which included a struggle over the number of nuclear-powered carriers.

No Secretary of Defense before McNamara had tried to exercise command authority over military operations. Before the 1958 Reorganization Act that put the Secretary of Defense in the chain of military command, no Secretary had even had such authority on paper. Their authority covered procurement, budget, personnel, administration, but not operational military matters. And since 1958 neither McElroy nor Gates had tried to exercise their new command authority over operations. McNamara was ready to do that, but he was being cautious. In this case, I could guess, he would face the likelihood that the Navy would leak the dispute to a friendly committee in Congress, in distorted fashion, and make him defend himself from the charge he was unduly entering into operations by ordering around individual ships.

[The next year during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when McNamara was asking pointed questions of Admiral Anderson, Burke's successor as Chief of Naval Operations, as to precisely how Navy ships would be implementing the blockade of Cuba, Anderson became so angry that he virtually ordered the Secretary of Defense out of the Flag Plot command post. "Now, Mr. Secretary," he said, "if you will go back to your office, the Navy will run the blockade." Once the crisis was over McNamara, in turn, removed Anderson as CNO. After Congressional pressure on his behalf, Anderson was made Ambassador to Portugal.]

I myself was faced with questions from the Vice President of RAND, Dick Goldstein, when I returned to California. General LeMay had recently sat in on a meeting of the Air Force Advisory Board, which controlled the RAND budget. Goldstein called me into his office and said, "Dan, this is hard to believe, but we have a charge here from

General LeMay—he's been told by Admiral Burke—that you have been giving the Navy orders on how to operate a destroyer squadron. Is this possible?"

I said, "What?!" It was true that most of the things I was doing in Washington would look madly presumptuous to most military officers, but I told him I had never done anything remotely like that. It took a second or two to guess what it must be referring to; the mention of Burke was the tip-off. I told Goldstein the whole story, and he passed it on. No one reprimanded me, though I it turned out Burke had asked LeMay to have me fired from RAND.

The San Joaquin County went back to Iwakuni.

[Epilogue in 1981, to be told later: My story is reported in the Washington Post—by Marvin Minter?--who gets confirmations from former Ambassador Reischauer—who reports that the situation had been known to the Japanese government-- and from Nitze. This leads to great publicity in Japan, and I'm invited to Japan by the Socialist Party (strongly anti-nuclear) to give lectures and interviews. The Japanese Defense Department continues to maintain that they had no awareness of such a situation, and were confident it did not occur. The San Joaquin County had at last been moved out of Japanese waters in 1967, six years after I had raised the question.

On this same trip, I give a briefing to a joint committee of the Diet (all parties represented except the ruling Liberals) at which I present them with a copy of the Halperin study of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958—as an example of a crisis in which Japan might have become involved in a nuclear exchange. The top secret study is promptly translated into Japanese and distributed, though my presentation is not mentioned in American reporting (including the Washington Post) about my briefing.]

ⁱ The National Security Archive has unearthed references to a flurry of memos stimulated by mine and by Stanley's investigation, and has asked to have them declassified, a request so far unsatisfied. (CHECK) These include: a memo to Mr. Williams from Ellsberg, 4/25/61, subject: Nuclear Weapons in Japanese Home Waters; memos between Timothy Stanley and General Dabney on this subject; memo to SecDef from Bundy, 5/4/61; memo to Admiral McCormick from Lang, 5/17/61, subject: Deployment of the San Joaquin County; memo to Secretary of the Navy from Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, 5/19/61; draft memo to Chief of Naval Operations, subject: Presence of Nuclear Weapons in Japan; memo for Nitze from Lang, 5/26/61, subject: crux of issue as to whether or not the deployment of the San Joaquin County is in violation of our commitments with Japan.

There are similar references to a later set of memos in June, 1966 about the *San Joaquin County* (also requested under FOIA by the National Security Archive) between McNamara, John McNaughton (Nitze's successor as Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA), and the JCS, apparently stimulated by the impending visit of the Director of the Japan Defense Agency.